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JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDING 
This Court has jurisdiction under Utah Code Annotated 
§ 78-2-2(3)(i) (1987), The trial court granted summary judgment 
and the Order of Dismissal was entered on August 18, 1988. (R. 
223-25) The Plaintiff filed her notice of appeal August 30, 
1988. (R. 228-29) 
ISSUES PRESENTED 
1. Did the trial court properly determine that the 
plaintiff-appellant required expert medical testimony to support 
her claims? 
2. Did the trial court properly determine that the 
doctrine of res ipsa loquitur could not apply because of the 
absence of a required evidentiary foundation? 
3. Did the trial court properly dismiss claims for 
alleged mental trauma? 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The plaintiff-appellant Jeanna M. Dalley ("Ms. 
Dalley") alleged claims for medical malpractice and mental trau-
ma because of an injury she claims to have suffered during the 
course of an elective cesarean section procedure which took 
place at Utah Valley Regional Medical Center ("Utah Valley") on 
February 5, 1985. Utah Valley is a division of IHC Hospitals, 
Inc. ("IHC"). After the procedure, Ms. Dalley was noted to have 
two black marks on her lower right leg, both of which were iden-
tified by some witnesses as a burn. Ms. Dalley said that the 
marks had not been present before she entered the operating 
room. Ms. Dalley also alleges that persons in the operating 
room smelled burning. 
Dr. Howard R. Francis, Ms. Dalley1s attending physi-
cian, examined the marks one day after the procedure, agreed 
that it was a burn, but opined that it was an old injury. Dr. 
Francis wrote: 
6 Feb. 85 . . . Does have what appears to be 
a 4-5 day old burn rt calf - pt did not know 
about it. It is asymptomatic. 
See Frances Affidavit at U 6, R. 114. [Medical Records, p. 22] 
Dr. Francis's statement in the medical records is the only 
medical evidence in the record which evaluates the burn and the 
time of its occurrence. In his affidavit, Dr. Francis stated: 
Based upon my observation of Jeanna Dalley1s 
leg on February 6, 1985, it is my belief 
that the burn was incurred by her prior to 
her admission to the hospital. 
I am not aware of any instrumentality which 
was near the patient's legs during the time 
of the surgery in question that could have 
caused or resulted in the burn on the pa-
tient' s lower right leg. 
(R. 114, emphasis added.) 
Dr. Gammett, who assisted Dr. Francis, stated by affi-
davit: 
I have no knowledge as to whether the burn 
on the patient's lower right leg was in-
curred prior to hospitalization. In addi-
tion, I have no knowledge or reason to be-
lieve that the burn was incurred during 
Jeanna Dalley's hospitalization. 
See also Gammett Affidavit at H 5. (R. 118.) 
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Ms. Dalley offered no medical expert testimony about the time 
that the burn had been incurred or what had caused it, relying 
on the theory of res ipsa loquitur. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Although Ms. Dalley contends that a layman has common 
knowledge that a patient should not get burned in an operating 
room, that proposition misstates the fundamental problem in this 
case: whether the burn predated the operating room procedure. 
Only expert medical testimony could establish the age of the 
burn. The only medical evidence in the record is Dr. Francis's 
statements that one day after surgery the burn appeared to be 4 
to 5 days old. The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur cannot apply 
when the injury in question apparently happened at a time earli-
er than the events alleged and could have had a variety of caus-
es. The trial court correctly assessed the need for expert 
medical testimony. Ms. Dalley1s failure to establish an eviden-
tiary foundation for res ipsa loquitur and her failure to demon-
strate causation justified summary judgment and demonstrate the 
doctrine's inapplicability to the facts and to multiple defen-
dants. Ms. Dalley has left a record bereft of the medical evi-
dence necessary to prove her case. The trial court correctly 
held that mental or emotional trauma damages were not justified. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DETERMINED THAT THIS IS 
NOT A RES IPSA LOQUITUR SITUATION 
Ms, Dalley correctly acknowledges the need for expert 
testimony in medical malpractice cases. Kim v. Anderson, 610 
P.2d 1270, 1271 (Utah 1980); Marsh v. Pemberton, 10 Utah 2d 
40, 347 P.2d 1108 (1959), overruled on other grounds, Swan v. 
Lamb, 584 P.2d 814, 817 (Utah 1978). She incorrectly tries to 
except herself from the general rule applicable in the overwhelm-
ing majority of situations by arguing that her burn is entitled 
to res ipsa loquitur analysis. 
Ms. Dalley must establish an evidentiary foundation 
comprised of three elements in order to apply res ipsa loqui-
tur. First, she must show that the accident or injury is of a 
type which would not have happened in the ordinary course had 
defendant(s) exercised due care. Second, the instrument or 
thing causing the injury must have been under the management or 
control of defendant(s) at the time of the accident. Third, the 
accident must have happened irrespective of plaintiff's partici-
pation. Nixdorf v. Hicken, 612 P.2d 352, 353 (Utah 1980). 
Ms. Dalley has failed to establish these elements. 
A. Appellant Presented No Foundation to Show that 
the Injury Would Not Have Occurred But for the 
Negligence of a Defendant. 
In the classic res ipsa loquitur cases involving al-
leged medical malpractice, a piece of medical equipment is left 
inside a patient's body. It takes no expertise to know that the 
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item could not get there by any means other than an open wound 
or an opening made during a surgical procedure. Finding the 
item in a body cavity lays the evidentiary foundation for at 
least one, if not all, of the required elements for res ipsa 
loquitur. Items do not get to the place of injury unless left 
during medical procedures; such items are controlled or managed 
by medical practitioners and the patient has no control over and 
generally can do nothing to remove the offending item. This 
case is significantly different. 
Initially, what the trial court correctly perceived is 
that an injury to the body's surface, such as a burn on the leg, 
can occur from a variety of causes, not limited to some act or 
omission which occurred in an operating room. Ms. Dalley's 
example from Prosser and Keeton on Torts of a patient who is 
burned by a hot water bottle assumes without stating that the 
hot water bottle was the only available source for the burn in 
question and that the burn was fresh. 
However, in this case, although Ms. Dalley claims her 
burn was not present before she went into surgery, she has of-
fered no medical evidence that the burn was fresh or new when 
observed. She asks this Court to assume, without evidence, that 
the burn was new and thus could only have occurred in the operat-
ing room. The assumption cannot reasonably be made. In fact, 
Dr. Francis states that the burn could not have occurred during 
the surgical procedure and that on the day following surgery the 
burn looked like a 4 to 5 day old burn. The strong and plausi-
-5-
ble inference to be drawn from this record is that the burn did 
not originate during the cesarean procedure but came into the 
operating room with Ms. Dalley herself. When an injury might 
have resulted from a variety of causes or circumstances and when 
the only medical evidence shows that the injury occurred at a 
time other than during surgery, the plaintiff cannot rely on res 
ipsa loquitur to prove her case. See Nixdorf. 
Ms. Dalley, who wishes to prove negligence by assump-
tion and to slough over the question of causation, must set 
forth proof because her assumptions have no foundation in medi-
cal fact. The appellant has the burden to prove negligence and 
causation. An old burn gives no foundation evidence to permit 
res ipsa loquitur to apply. 
B. Appellant Must Present Medical Evidence to 
Establish When the Burn Occurred. 
Whether a burn is fresh or old is a question requiring 
medical competence and a medical opinion based on reasonable 
medical probability. Ms. Dalley could not refute her doctor's 
opinion by her own allegation. A lay person such as Ms. Dalley 
cannot make that determination and cannot controvert medical 
evidence. 
She has offered no medical evidence when the burn 
occurred; she has only allegations that it might have occurred 
when she says. Allegations are insufficient to overcome affida-
vits. Freed Fin. Co. v. Stoker Motor Co., 537 P.2d 1039 (Utah 
-6-
1975). This is not a res ipsa loquitur case. Summary judgment 
was properly granted to Utah Valley and IHC. 
C. The Appellant Has Identified No Instrument That 
Caused Injury and No Management or Control of 
Any Instrument. 
The second foundation element of res ipsa loquitur 
requires the plaintiff to identify an instrument or item which 
caused the injury and the defendant or defendants who had con-
trol of it. In the classic terms of negligence, the plaintiff 
must prove injury, causation and damage. The doctrine of res 
ipsa loquitur does not depart from these fundamentals but per-
mits certain assumptions only if foundation elements are estab-
lished. Ms. Dalley's failure to identify anything that could 
have caused the 4 or 5 day old asymptomatic burn and her con-
commitant failure to show that the unidentified thing was under 
the control of any defendant-respondent demonstrate her failure 
to show causation. Causation is a required element to her 
claim. Robinson v. Intermountain Health Care, 740 P.2d 262 
(Utah App. 1987). Ms. Dalleyfs case simply fails for lack of 
foundation, mandating summary judgment. 
D. Ms. Dalley Has Not Established the Third 
Foundation Element. 
If the trial court had assumed without evidence (1) 
that Ms. Dalley had an injury which, with reasonable medical 
probability, occurred during surgery and (2) that an identifi-
able object under the control of some or all of the defendants 
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had been its cause, then the Court might have had a basis for 
determining the third foundation element, whether the injury 
occurred without participation by Ms. Dalley. However, infer-
ring this element is precluded by the absence of any other foun-
dation element. Res ipsa loquitur requires more than Ms. 
Dalley1s assertions that she was injured. The trial court thus 
properly granted summary judgment to Utah Valley and IHC. 
II. RES IPSA LOQUITUR CANNOT BE APPLIED TO 
MULTIPLE DEFENDANTS IN THIS CASE. 
Because the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur does not 
justify a reversal of the trial court's decision, the alleged 
applicability of res ipsa loquitur to multiple defendants is 
irrelevant. The fact that some states apply res ipsa loquitur 
to multiple defendants cannot supersede required foundation 
elements before the doctrine can be applied at all. 
Ms. Dalley cites Schaffner v. Cumberland County Hospi-
tal System, Inc., 77 N.C. App. 689, 336 S.E.2d 116 (1985) re-
view denied, 316 N.C. 195, 341 S.E.2d 578 (1986), which applies 
standards different from the Utah law set forth in the Nixdorf 
case. Even under Schaffner, Ms. Dalley has problems of evi-
dence, foundation and logic. 
The plaintiff in Schaffner made an evidentiary show-
ing of a key foundation element: she had, through the deposi-
tion testimony of one of the defendants, established that a 
piece of medical equipment used in cauterizing blood vessels had 
sparked and misfunctioned during her surgery. That same defen-
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dant also testified that no grounding plate had been placed 
under the plaintiff, although the use of such a plate was part 
of the accepted standard of care when the cauterizing equipment 
was to be used. 
In Schaffner the plaintiff was required to lay a 
foundation before the court was able to determine whether the 
res ipsa loquitur doctrine accepted in North Carolina could be 
applied to multiple defendants. Ms. Dalley does not offer any 
such evidence. It is illogical to apply a res ipsa loquitur 
theory to a group of different defendants in the absence of 
medical evidence to establish even the occurrence of the injury 
or evidence of what instrumentality led to the injury. Without 
evidence, Ms. Dalley1s position has no merit. Summary judgment 
was proper. 
III. THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY DENIED ANY CLAIM 
FOR MENTAL TRAUMA DAMAGES. 
Ms. Dalley leaps to two conclusions based upon her 
unsupported assumptions. The first is that since each of the 
defendants was present in the operating room each was negligent 
-- a proposition fully refuted because of her failure to estab-
lish a res ipsa loquitur foundation -- and then concludes that 
she has a valid claim for emotional injuries. Utah law simply 
does not support such a conclusion. 
In Johnson v. Rogers, 763 P.2d 221 (Utah 1988), the 
Utah Supreme Court agreed to recognize the tort of infliction of 
emotional distress, adopting the standards set forth in Section 
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313, Restatement Second Torts (and explanatory comments) as 
the legal standard. The Court did not apply the rule retroac-
tively. Ms. Dalley*s claim is not covered by Johnson. 
Moreover, the Johnson decision does not assist Ms. 
Dalley to carry her evidentiary burden as a plaintiff since she 
must still offer some elements of proof if she is to prevail on 
any claim in negligence, including a claim for emotional dis-
tress. Unlike this case, Johnson did not involve injuries and 
emotional distress in an ambiguous situation in which the plain-
tiff relied totally on personal allegations and res ipsa loqui-
tur to show physical injury. Serious and substantial injury had 
occurred at a proven time and by a proven instrument: a truck 
had struck and killed a child and injured its parent. To recov-
er for emotional distress under Johnson, a person must be in-
jured or in the zone of danger as a result of proven negligence. 
Although Ms. Dalley was allegedly injured, she has no 
proof. She alleges the injury but certainly has not proven it 
to have occurred during surgery or that it was caused by any 
action or omission of Utah Valley or IHC. Before she can claim 
damages for some form of emotional trauma which purportedly 
arose from the burn on her leg (assuming arguendo that she is 
to be permitted to plead the tort from circumstances she claims 
occurred some three years before the Johnson decision), she 
must show that the burn was caused by some defendant at a time 
established by medical testimony. Even though she may have been 
emotionally upset because there was a burn on her leg, she has 
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failed to offer evidence to justify a claim for emotional injury 
on this record. 
Even adopting the more liberal views of the Johnson 
case over those in the prior leading decision, Reiser v. 
Lohner, 641 P.2d 93 (Utah 1982), which stated the law at the 
time Ms. Dalley alleges her injury, Ms. Dalley1s claim for emo-
tional distress has been shown meritless after pretrial proceed-
ings. The decision granting summary judgment on the emotional 
claim, like the decision on the other issues she raised, was 
correct and should be affirmed by this Court. 
CONCLUSION 
The Defendants-Respondents Utah Valley and IHC respect-
fully request that the trial court's decision be affirmed and 
that they be granted such other and further relief, including 
costs and fees, as may be just and proper. 
Dated: February 14, 1989. 
KIRTON, McCONKIE & POELMAN 
By rni 7feti^^^^ 
Charles W. Dahlquist II 
M. Karlynn Hinman 
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
UTAH COUNTY., STATE OF UTAH 
******* 
JEANNA M. DALLEY, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
UTAH VALLEY REGIONAL 
HOSPITAL, et al. , 
Defendants. 
Case Number:CV 87-206 
RULING 
******** 
This matter is before the court on defendants' motions 
for summary judgment. Plaintiff opposes the motions, and all 
parties have filed memo of points and authorities in support of 
their respective positions. The court having carefully considered 
the motions and the accompanying memo, and having heard oral 
argument, now enters its: 
RULING 
Defendants' motions for summary judgment are well taken 
and are hereby granted. 
The motions are based on two grounds: First the 
doctrine of res ipsa loquitur does not apply here; second, there 
is no cause of action for negligent infliction of emotional 
distress. 
To apply the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur requires the 
establishment of evidentiary foundation. The elements of the 
evidentiary foundation are: (1) the accident was of a kind which, 
m the ordinary course of events, would not have happened had the 
defendant(s) used due care, (2) the instrument or thing causing 
the injury was at the time of the accident under the management 
and control of the defendant(s) , and (3) the accident happened 
irrespective of any participation at the time by plaintiff. 
Nixdorf v, Hicken, 612 P.2d 352-53 (Utah 1980). It is undisputed 
that plaintiff, nor defendant(s), cannot identify the offending 
instrumentality to say nothing of management or control thereof. 
In addition, in medical malpractice cases, plaintiff 
is required to produce expert medical testimony, except in 
exceptional cases (of which this may be one if an instrumentality 
could be found) to establish that the outcome was more likely the 
result of negligence than some other cause. Robinson v. 
Intermountain Health Care Inc., 740 P.2d 262 (Utah App. 1987). 
Here, plaintiff has failed to establish sufficient 
foundation for the application of res ipsa loquitur, and has 
failed to produce expert medical testimony, and since this is not 
an exceptional case, res ipsa loquitur does not apply. Even 
assuming the jury would infer negligence by some body, if they 
believe that plaintiff had no burn when she arrived at the 
hospital, the failure to show what instrumentality caused the 
burn, and which defendant(s) controlled that instrumentality 
would still leave us without any specific culpable party or 
parties. Therefore, the application of res ipsa loquitur in this 
matter is inappropriate. 
The failure to show what caused the injury also 
precludes maintaining an action for negligent infliction of 
emotional distress• 
Based on the foregoing analysis, defendants' motions 
for summary judgment are hereby granted. 
DATED in Provo, Utah thisj day of August, 1988. 
^GEORGE E.£%ALLIF, JUDGE./ 
,«^s® 
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f.riU'Sr.CUi5* 
Charles W. Dahlquist (0798) 
Sherene T. Dillon (4820) 
KIRTON, McCONKIE <S BUSHNELL 
Attorneys for Defendants 
Utah Valley Regional Medical Center and 
IHC Hospitals, Inc., dba 
Utah Valley Regional Medical Center 
330 South Third East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-2599 
Telephone: (801) 521-3680 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
JEANNA M. DALLEY, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
UTAH VALLEY REGIONAL MEDICAL 
CENTER, I.H.C. HOSPITALS, INC. 
dba UTAH VALLEY REGIONAL 
MEDICAL CENTER, HOWARD R. 
FRANCIS, M.D., KENT R. 
GAMMETTE, M.D., PROVO OBSTETRICS 
AND GYNECOLOGY CLINIC, and JAMES 
P. SOUTHWICK, M.D., 
Defendant. 
O R D E R 
Civil No. 87-206 
Judge George E. Ballif 
The defendants' Motions for Summary Judgment and the 
plaintiff's Motion in Limine having come on for .hearing before 
the Honorable George E. Ballif, the plaintiff being represented 
by S. Rex Lewis; defendant James P. Southwick, M.D. being 
represented by attorney Elizabeth King Brennan; defendants Dr. 
Howard R. Francis, M.D. and Kent R. Gammette, M.D. and Provo 
Obstetrics and Gynecology Clinic being represented by William W. 
Barrett; and defendants Utah Valley Regional Medical Center and 
IHC Hospitals, Inc. being represented by Charles W. Dahlquist, 
II, the Court having heard full argument on the motions pending 
and, in addition, having reviewed, in camera, the records of a 
subsequent patient at Utah Valley Regional Medical Center whom 
the plaintiff had claimed received a burn on the leg in a 
similar manner, and the Court being fully advised in the 
premises, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that, pursuant 
to the Ruling of the Court dated August 1, 1988, the Motions for 
Summary Judgment of each of the defendants is hereby granted, 
the plaintiff's Motion in Limine is denied, and this matter is 
hereby dismissed with prejudice as to all defendants, the 
parties to bear their own respective costs. 
DATED this / ^  day of August, 1988. 
BY THE COURT: 
SORGE^ BALL IF 
D i s t r i c t Judge 
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